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WINDS OF CHANGE 1989 
A PERSPECTIVE FROM AN OFFICE FOR RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS SOMEWHERE IN 
EASTERN EUROPE 
By Vjekoslav Perica 
Vjekoslav Perica is a Croatian-American historian, author of, among others, Balkan Idols: Religion 
and Nationalism in Yugoslav States (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002) and Pax 
Americana in the Adriatic and the Balkans: History, Memory and Cultural Representations of U.S. 
Peacemaking, 1919-2014 (in Croatian), (Zagreb: Algoritam, 2015). He currently works on a book 
and humanitarian-peacemaking project tentatively titled, “Balkanization and Reconciliation.”  
Perica holds a Ph.D. in history from the University of Minnesota Twin Cities, USA. In the 1970s 
in former Yugoslavia, he was a basketball player; in the 1980s he was a jurist and journalist until 
coming to America in 1991. As a US academic, he has been a Fulbright scholar in Belgrade, Serbia, 
and in 2012 he held a research fellowship at Netherlands Institute for Advanced Studies in the 
Humanities and Social Sciences (NIAS). Since 2006, Perica has been a Professor of History at the 
University of Rijeka, Croatia from which he is retiring this year. Perica lives in Baltimore, 
Maryland and on the Dalmatian isle of Šolta, Croatia. In between, most enthusiastically, he spends 
time with grandsons and their pets in New York City. 
Under communism, in what used to be Eastern Europe, religion was neither outlawed nor 
favorably regarded either. In some cases, church and state had been at latent or open war as in 
Poland or in the former Yugoslavia. There, church-state relations radically changed over the course 
of more than five decades, which is the theme of this article. Confrontations began in 1945 and 
spanned to 1953. Accommodations from 1966 to 1980 permitted a relatively peaceful coexistence 
between church and state. Thereafter the public religions and ethnic mobilizations of the 1980s 
escalated into the Balkan wars of the 1990s. It was during this era when the major faiths merged 
with the ethnic warring factions. As the Cold War ended, and communist regimes collapsed across 
East Central Europe, Yugoslav post-Titoist elites in the two westernmost Yugoslav republics 
presented reform-minded positions and images. Revising restrictive policies toward religion 
seemed appropriate for a start. Slovenia, soon followed by Croatia, symbolically promoted 
Christmas greetings and programs on state TV. In Croatia, regional and local offices for religious 
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affairs were urged from higher state and party authorities to make religious organizations the ailing 
regime’s friends.  
Religious communities generally welcomed the new policies, yet their responses varied 
depending on whether they were majority or minority groups. Religious minorities would show 
support for the reforms to abolish official atheism, expand religious liberty, and democratize the 
country whose unity they did not question. By contrast, the majority religions, notably Serbian 
Orthodoxy and Croat Catholicism--and after 1989, also Bosnian Islam--preferred balkanization of 
the multiethnic federation to be replaced by homogenous ethno-confessional nation-states with 
religious monopolies.  
These notes outline some aspects of the landmark change according to the records from the 
City Council’s Office for Religious Affairs in Split, Dalmatia, Croatia’s largest coastal city. The 
picture is polished by reminiscences of the office’s administrator, who happens to be a firsthand 
witness and survivor of the Great Transformation–namely this article’s author. 
In 1989, the tiny local church community of the Seventh-day Adventists appointed a new 
pastor. He visited the city office for religious affairs to introduce himself and inquire about 
renovation of their house for worship. The meeting was held in a spacious mayor’s office over 
sandwiches and refreshments, which was not customary prior to the relaxation. The new location 
and logistics were to showcase the similarly new liberal policy, outlined in the fresh set of 
instructions from above. The communists must free themselves from “sectarian mentality,” a 
Croatian Communist party document pointed out in order to argue that the party now needs to 
embrace everyone, including religious believers willing to support the key values of the 
multiethnic federalism, socialist self-managed economy, and nonaligned foreign policy.  
The state and the party granted a generous funding for the logistical support to meetings 
with religious authorities. Hence, the mayor made available her salon, notably adorned with 
portrait of the city’s leaders from Emperor Diocletian to the last communist, and staff portraits for 
the purpose of banquets and receptions. However, the treatment of the major churches and 
religious minorities differed considerably. Thus, if the visitors to the office for religious affairs 
were the Catholic Archbishop metropolitan or Serbian Orthodox bishop, the mayor would make 
sure to greet religious leaders personally as waiters in formal attire serve Dalmatian scampi risotto, 
Italian prosciutto, and fine wines.  For an Adventist pastor, however, the sandwiches would do.  
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 Nonetheless, the chairman and the administrator greeted the young pastor with cordial 
smiles and kind words. Moreover, the sandwiches were made vegetarian and beverages non-
alcoholic to show respect for this religion’s nutritional habits. The young cleric was originally 
from the Vojvodina, Yugoslavia’s remarkable ethnically and religiously diverse province, 
although the wars of the 1990s remarkably enhanced the Serb relative majority, while local 
societies still remained pluralistic. In the Vojvodina autonomous province, besides the two major 
Christian Churches encompassing the two largest nationalities, the Serbs and the Croats, there 
were also some 40 plus smaller, mainly Christian, groups, with the membership of several dozen 
ethnic minorities. The pastor spoke in the Serbo-Croatian ekavian urban dialect of Novi Sad and 
Belgrade where he went to school and served before. An active and outgoing personality, he 
revealed that his congregation held weekly worship services in a private apartment on the 10th floor 
of a suburban socialist-era skyscraper. The flock did not proselytize in the neighborhood, however, 
former pastors explained. Instead, he initiated cordial greetings in the halls and elevators, in the 
streets and plazas, and small everyday talks aimed at showing that the church members were 
friendly neighbors prepared to help everyone. The Church owned a house of worship at a 
prestigious city center location next to large park. Yet, the building, damaged during the 
construction of the city’s underground railway, was not functional and needed a thorough 
reconstruction. City authorities covered the damage, and the Church secured additional funding 
from its own resources. The construction could begin, but stalled for many years. The problem 
was not the regime’s ideological bias but bureaucratic hairsplitting, combined with difficulties 
caused by the failing socialist urban development. It was not about ideological obstruction in late 
socialism, as the antireligious aspect of the ideology had lost most of its revolutionary zeal.  
The pastor took a bite of a vegetarian sandwich listening to the chairman of the Committee 
for religious affairs elaborating the new policy: “Dear Sir, our party is changing course,” comrade 
chairman explained: “From now on, you get not just vegetarian sandwiches but also free legal 
assistance and most importantly, license for rebuilding the church! I mean--promptly, say, how 
about next week; you just stop by and pick up all the documents.…”  The Seventh-day Adventist 
was stunned. He looked in disbelief, paused with his vegetarian sandwich and almost spilled a 
glass of lemonade on a Persian rug made in Bosnia.  
The local congregation of Seventh-Day Adventists would soon begin the renovation and 
enlargement of their house of worship. The project paused during the war in Croatia and Bosnia-
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Herzegovina 1991-1995. The new, enlarged and modernized church finally opened in 1998. The 
local newspaper, controlled by the ruling nationalistic Croat-Catholic party, acknowledged the 
Adventists’ humanitarian work with refugees during the war. Moreover, the paper bragged that the 
new democratic government, celebrating religious liberty previously suppressed by godless 
communists, had issued nearly a hundred licenses for new church construction in the city 
metropolitan area. This was not quite true. The city archives and records show that from 1988 to 
1991 alone, the office for religious affairs issued 75 licenses for new churches and a mosque. What 
actually changed when the nationalists took power in 1990, was that the new administration 
allowed Catholic parishes and monasteries to increase ambitions and skip rules and boundaries. 
This resulted in several dozen landmarks of the new era: ugly, triumphalist, and boastful sacral 
architecture. The new construction devastated parks and recreation areas, penetrated pedestrian 
zones on ancient plazas, and in suburbia it competed with corporate warehouses and shopping 
malls as conspicuous landmarks of the new landscape. 
In the landmark year of 1989, the office for religious affairs in the city of Split also recorded 
a historic meeting with Jehovah Witnesses. Historic it was, regarding the fact that nobody ever 
invited them for a visit and talk before, let alone the sandwiches and refreshments. Most 
importantly, friendly meetings were followed by quick authorization of new church construction. 
Three Jehovah’s Witnesses leaders dressed in dark blue and grey suits visited the office for 
religious affairs. Their visit succeeded the office’s invitation for a meeting, promising to address 
the group’s long-standing request for their Hall for meetings and worship. The office would have 
previously never invited them except for issuing of warnings and reprimands about conscientious 
objectors’ conflict with the Yugoslav Army and for knocking on concerned citizens’ doors. Two 
of the three church leaders were from the local congregation and the third arrived form the capital 
Belgrade. It was made known to us by the office by the local state security police department, that 
they all did time in prison between 5-15 years for refusing to carry weapons during military service.  
Jehovah’s Witnesses politely declined the sandwiches accepting only water and lemonade. 
The talk about the request for a larger Meeting Hall was brief. Then the office’s administrator 
guided the guests to the adjacent Department for Urban Planning where a building license awaited 
them along with friendly experts and counselors who could help with the details. Jehovah’s 
Witnesses, although used to witnessing unexpected scenarios when knocking uninvited on 
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people’s doors to deliver The Watchtower journal, this time looked surprised and confused, if not 
shocked. 
A week later, two of the three Jehovah Witnesses who previously visited the Office for 
Religious Affairs knocked on the committee administrator’s doors without appointment. They 
brought a gift, a nicely gift-wrapped bottle of scotch whiskey. The brand was rather cheap, 
however; probably because of Jehovah’s Witnesses’ ignorance about good whiskeys rather than 
frugality. Back then, under mature Titoism, Yugoslav socialist middle class preferred a rather 
expensive imported Chivas 12 years old scotch whiskey, famously enjoyed by Tito himself. Yet, 
practicing religious believers in communist Yugoslavia were unlikely to express interest in the 
atheistic dictator’s drinking habits. Jehovah Witnesses, holding the gift, sat solemnly, telling their 
previous bitter experiences with this office, speaking on the verge of tears. They wished to express 
gratitude, they said, for the kindness and understanding unseen before by the members of their 
community in interaction with this government. The administrator politely declined to accept the 
gift. He advised, with tongue-in check, that it could better serve purpose later in the process to 
make happier and more efficient the late socialist-era construction inspectors. 
Paradoxically, Yugoslav communist authorities harassed the non-threatening religious 
opposition while appeasing the regime’s avowed clerical-nationalist enemies. Religious minorities 
were mistreated solely because of their religiosity. Their congregations were multiethnic and 
apolitical. Their members were often from mixed marriages and multiethnic families naturally 
supportive of Yugoslav unity and federalism, but abhorrent to the major ethnic nationalisms such 
as Great Serbian and Croat separatist. Serbian and Croatian churches, and by the late 1980s, also 
the third largest religion, the Islamic Community of Bosnia and Herzegovina, had all fused 
religious and national identity while seeking the balkanization of Yugoslavia. By contrast, 
religious minorities, although opposing communist party monopoly and official atheism, preferred 
a united multiethnic Yugoslavia. 
The Titoist regime repression of Jehovah Witnesses and the Nazarenes as conscientious 
objectors exemplifies methods that not even the worst clerical nationalists had suffered. 
Conscientious objectors challenged the Yugoslav Peoples’ Army–the most rigid segment of the 
regime. This persecution against religious minorities did not ease during the liberalized socialism 
of the seventies and eighties. At the same time, the Serbian Orthodox Church and Croatian national 
Catholicism became locomotives of ethnic nationalist movements. After Tito’s death, it became 
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 clear that the ethno-confessional blocks sought to dismantle the Yugoslav federation and replace 
it with ethnic nation-states. The project would involve the partitioning of Bosnia-Herzegovina and 
therefore, a major war. The regime, however, harassed religious minorities and only sporadically 
applied repression against the major churches while negotiating and seeking some kind of a deal 
with the two clerical elites.  
Unlike the grateful representatives of the Seventh-day Adventists and Jehovah’s Witnesses 
responding to the policy changes of 1989, the majority clerical elites smelled power; and that in 
1989 became quite visible. They turned arrogant and demanding. While visiting this office for 
religious affairs in the late 1980s, the Croat Catholic Archbishop and the Serb Bishop posed not 
just as negotiators with leverage but also as superior political rivals. This duo openly showed scorn 
for government officials, looking down on them and asking to negotiate with the top state and 
federal authorities. The Catholic Archbishop, for example, criticized the government for not 
responding appropriately to a then-galloping Serbian nationalism. yet stopped short of promising 
the Church’s support for at least moderate nationalists in the first multiparty elections although a 
coalition of the left and nationalist moderates, if victorious, could have averted the war. Speaking 
of which, both major churches had considered the partition and war options as early as 1987; the 
Serbian Orthodox Church expressed it openly. Historians would find noteworthy the following 
episode: a meeting in the office for religious affairs with the Serbian Orthodox Bishop, regarding 
preparations for the 600th anniversary of the Kosovo Battle in June 1989. This Bishop  first ignored 
the license to rebuild the local parish church presented to him by the city authorities, aimed at 
countering the media campaign from Belgrade. The Bishop’s refusal to comply with Croatia’s 
authorities, motivated solely by ethnic and religious hatred, was based on long-standing negligence 
to provide the Serb Orthodox community in Split a place of worship. As the meeting neared 
conclusion, the Serb bishop mentioned the following: “Let me tell, you, gentlemen, that our 
Church has very good relations with the Yugoslav People’s Army. For celebrating the Kosovo 
battle jubilee’s in Dalmatia, we have asked military authorities at Knin to lend us their large tents 
for the faithful to gather in the shade around the church after the liturgy. They gladly granted our 
request. You should know, gentlemen, our Church and our army are on very good terms, we are 
very close friends. In case of a serious crisis I am sure that we would be on the same side,” the 
bishop remarked with a cynical grin.  
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 At the time, the government officials were left surprised while contemplating the meaning 
of the new discourse. Two years later, the Serbian minority in Croatia staged an armed rebellion 
headquartered at the city of Knin. Subsequently, an all-out war in Croatia broke out with the major 
battle over the city of Vukovar, on the border between Serbia and Croatia. The city was defended 
by Croat separatist militia and besieged by the Yugoslav Army and Serb nationalist paramilitaries. 
As Croat fighters wore crosses and were assisted by military chaplains, some Serbian church 
leaders sprinkled holy water on the tanks rolling to the battle. 
After the collapse of Yugoslavia and Balkan wars of the 1990s, new nation-states came to 
life across the balkanized region. The criminal practices of ethnic cleansing made them ethnically 
homogenous more than ever before in history. The new Serbia and Croatia were designed 
according to the new model of Balkan nationalism as mutually hostile, ethnocentric states, each 
with a religious monopoly or “national church.” Religious and ethnic minorities continued to be 
stigmatized groups and second-class citizens sharing the sorry fate with atheists who once 
persecuted them. Ironically, many of the atheists had learned how to stay in power by adopting the 
new state-sponsored religiosity.  
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